Abstract-Based on fieldwork in Yugoslavia and China. we compare medicine in two societies which are attempting to construct their own unique paths to socialism. After a brief description of each country and its sociopolitical system, we sketch the broad outlines of the health care system which has evolved. We then discuss certain constraints on achieving the socialist objectives of equality of access to health care and democratization of the patient-clinician relationship.
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evaluations of socialist and capitalist medicine seem to us premature without more careful and informed case studies, especially on 'medicine under socialism'.
The present paper is intended as a contribution to this end. Based on extended fieldwork in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China, we report on two aspects of medical care: access to care and the patient-clinician relationship.
As Waitzkin and Waterman [S] stress, access to medical care and the doctor-patient relationship are generally stratified in capitalist society. On the one hand, different segments of the society have differential access to care. On the other hand, based on differential access to medical information, the doctor-patient relationship is characteristically hierarchical. Given claims that such stratification can be transcended under socialism, these would seem important areas to explore in societies which have experienced a socialist revolution.
Before turning to our case studies of Yugoslav and Chinese medicine, a comment on the approach we take is in order. In framing our description and analysis. we have been guided by a recent attempt by Rieker and Begun [6] to posit a 'social model of the illness process'. While intended as a model for organizing and teaching social science knowledge in medical schools, it also provides a useful framework for understanding how macro-and microsocial factors influence medical practice. As Rieker and Begun suggest, a distinctly social analysis of medical practice must take account of the wider social context (e.g. legal. political and economic institutions; health service organization) as well as social positions occupied by patients and clinicians (e.g. age, sex, occupation, class, geographic location). Applied to our present concerns. this model directs our attention first to the larger contexts of Yugoslav and Chinese socialism, and to the ways these societies have chosen to allocate and organize health resources. Once these macrosocial factors have been described, we can then examine access to care and the patientxlinician relationship in each society. It is at this point that we consider the influence of relevant patient and clinician social positions. Tito's Yugoslavia has proven more successful than the pre-war monarchy in unifying these diverse groups. In large measure, this can be attributed to the unique form of sociopolitical and economic organization which has evolved under the general rubric of se/fmanuging socialism.
After breaking with the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia gradually moved from a highly centralized system of government and state planning to a much more decentralized arrangement giving greater formal decision-making power to the republics and communes
Enterprises have gained considerable autonomy and are managed by workers themselves with decreasing state interference and increasing reliance on the market (worker se/fmunugemenr). Although the state [S] and political elites can and do intervene in guiding overall development of the country and influencing decision-making at all levels, there has been a genuine increase in the range of issues which are dealt with through direct negotiation among interested individuals and groups. Furthermore, opportunities for workers and citizens to participate in decision-making in their places of work and residence have expanded through creation of numerous participatory institutions (e.g. workers' councils, tenant councils, assemblies of users and providers of social services).
As measured by various indicators of economic and social development, Yugoslavia has made considerable progress. It has had one of the highest economic growth rates in the world. Per cupita income in current prices increased from less than $100 at the war's end to over $2000 in 1977 [9, lo] . Given the emphasis placed on industrialization and urbanization, the agrarian population declined from 63",, in 1948 to 38", in 1971 Remaining legalized private practice (involving less than I",, of all physicians and dentists) is scheduled to be phased out by 1985 [15, 161. For the Yugoslav who seeks medical care. the usual point of entry is the local health center. Staffed by general practitioners, dentists, nurses, laboratory workers and a limited number of specialists, the health center provides most outpatient care for residents in one or more communes, and integrates curative, preventive, educational and certain epidemiologi- For more specialized consultations and treatment on an outpatient basis, the general practitioner or other health center clinics make referrals to a polyclinic attached to a general hospital and staffed with a wide range of specialists and subspecialists. The patient normally returns to the local health center for prescriptions or hospital referral. As in most countries with a national health program, inpatient care is provided by full-time staffs in a relatively small number of large general and specialized hospitals.
To minimize expensive and unnecessary duplication of services, attempts have been made to integrate and coordinate the work of health institutions in a commune or over larger areas. On the one hand, there has been a tendency since the late 1950s for the health center, polyclinic and general hospital in a given commune to merge to form a medical center. On the other hand. there are efforts to coordinate the development of highly specialized services in a network of regional and republic-level hospitals, a goal, however, which often comes in conflict with the aspirations of autonomous local institutions. Each of these individual health institutions is selfmanaged and self-financed. Employees of health institutions (like those of all socialized Yugoslav work organizations) participate in the management of their workplaces directly as members of the assembly of workers (all employees) and indirectly through their elected delegates in the workers' council. These selfmanagement bodies decide on the organization of work. hiring and firing, allocations of revenues and setting of pay scales. while day-to-day administration is left to the institution's director (usually a physician) and management board. To ensure representation of broader social interests. community delegates are included in self-management bodies. Nevertheless, health professionals retain a large measure of control over local institutions given their numerical advantage in these bodies and the tendency for community members to defer to professional expertise.
In contrast to China where considerable funding comes from the state budget. Yugoslav health institutions are largely self-financing.
Not unlike various prepaid group practices in the United States, most health care costs and a portion of capital expenditures are financed through annual contracts negotiated prospectively with local health insurance associations. Other sources of funds include contracts with local work organizations for providing specific services to their employees. direct patient fees and government payments for certain groups (e.g. veterans, the indigent). On the basis of referenda, residents in one or more communes may also agree to make contributions for specific capital expansion projects.
Self-managing socialism has also shaped the organization of the local insurance associations.
At one time part of the state administration, they are now autonomous organizations self-managed by assemblies composed of users and providers of services in a given commune. With the aid of a professional staff of administrators, the assembly is responsible for health planning and programming in the commune, negotiates contracts with provider institutions and decides on the rate of contributions to be collected as a payroll deduction from those employed in the socialized sector or as a tax or per capita payment from private farmers. craft workers and free professionals (e.g. writers, artists) [18] . Republic laws mandate a basic level of rights and benefits which must be insured, although local associations may opt for more comprehensive coverage provided they agree to collect the necessary funds. Republic-level 'solidarity funds' assist communes unable to afford the basic level of services.
Gaining access to care
According to the Yugoslav Constitution, "everyone shall be entitled to health care" [19] . However in Yugoslavia (as in all other societies) this goal remains somewhat elusive. Although the country's commitment to national health insurance and to increasing the supply and improving the distribution of health personnel and facilities has made health care more accessible to the population, there are still financial and organizational barriers to obtaining care, in general, and higher quality care, in particular. Socialist aspirations to the contrary, there continues to be differential access to care depending on the specific 'location' of the sick person in the social structure of Yugoslav society.
In this regard, decentralization of health administration and financing has had direct consequences for the problem of accessibility.
While it can permit a closer fit between health service delivery and local needs and greater participation of users and providers in health care decision-making, there have been tradeoffs in the form of persisting inequalities in the availability and development of health services given the country's uneven economic development. Despite redistribution of a portion of locally-derived health monies via the solidarity funds, residents in wealthier and usually urban areas have easier access to higher quality care than do their counterparts in the poorer, mostly rural areas. Under such a decentralized arrangement, wealthier communes can generate a larger pool of health funds from which to finance more comprehensive care and more modern and betterequipped and staffed facilities. Accessibility of care does not only depend on whether one lives in a more or less prosperous commune. Another factor is employment status. With industrialization as one of socialist Yugoslavia's key development objectives, greater priority has been given to providing mandatory health insurance coverage as well as special facilities (industrial outpatient 'clinics) for workers in the socialized sector. It was only after the late 1950s that health insurance was extended to farmers (who have remained largely in the private sector) and to others privately employed (craft workers, professionals, private restaurant and hotel owners. etc.). Even then, benefits provided without payment at the point of delivery have usually been more comprehensive for those covered under workers' insurance with corresponding implications for easier access to care. However, the tendency towards equalization of benefits for workers and farmers during the 1970s is beginning to erase some of the differences in accessibility to care related solely to employment status.
Finally, ease of access is limited by what is commonly referred to as 'bureaucracy'. As in all societies with a national health program. there are certain formal procedures governing where and how a sick person obtains care. To illustrate. although a sick person in Yugoslavia is not necessarily assigned to a specific general practitioner, he/she is still required to have a referral ticket from the GP to obtain specialist care. Or, to keep health funds within the commune, insurance associations have made it more difficult for their beneficiaries to seek care outside the local service area (e.g. by requiring signatures from three physicians rather than one for referral outside the commune with full reimbursement).
It should nevertheless be noted that various informal means are at times used to bypass such bureaucratic barriers and therefore enhance the accessibility of care. For example, it is not that uncommon for a Party member or someone else with 'connections' to obtain care wherever and whenever he or she chooses. Similarly, although illegal, bribes in the form of money or gifts may also give certain Yugoslavs an advantage over others in getting care.
The putient-clinicicm relutionshp
Finally, we shall note a few features of the patientclinician relationship in the Yugoslav setting. In contrast to the Soviet Union and China, Yugoslavia has not attempted to train physician-substitutes or extenders, so that the important clinician to consider is the physician.
While decentralization and selfmanagement have to some extent democratized decision-making between users and providers of services concerning health policy and planning issues. the relationship between patient and physician is still largely hierarchical.
Patients continue to defer to the 'professional mystique' of physicians who have retained considerable prestige in Yugoslav society, notwithstanding low personal incomes relative to physicians in many capitalist societies or occasional campaigns to equalize their status with other workers 1203. Disproportionate recruitment into medical school of children of experts, managers and administrators only serves to reinforce this pattern [21] .
However, this is not to say that the clinicians are in complete control in face-to-face interaction with patients. For one thing, the organization and linancing of health care place certain limits on what is possible. For example, to control costs, some communal insurace associations have attempted to restrict drugs which are covered by insurance funds, with definite implications for physicians' prescribing habits. Patients as well are not entirely without bargaining power in the patient-clinician encounter. Thus, with a crowded waiting room of patients. it may be the easiest course of action for the physician to give in to patient demands for sick leave certification or specialist exams. In addition, the use of bribes and connections also tends to shape the clinicians' decisions apart from purely medical criteria.
At this point, we would make one further comment on the patient-clinician relationship in Yugoslavia. In our discussion thus far, we have interpreted the giving of money or gifts to clinicians as 'bribes'. as something given by a patient to persuade or induce the clinician to do something the patient desires or simply as a means to get around the 'svstem' more easily. However, based on our observatrons in Yugoslavia. they can also serve the function of a gratuity; that is. something given without claim or demand on the part of the patient. Thus, despite the fact that their care was covered by health insurance. it was not uncommon for patients to give something to physicians or other health workers out of gratitude for services provided. Whether this reflects some sort of underlying principle of reciprocity in the patient-clinician relationship or merely another way to insure against future health needs is something which requires further study.
CHIN4
The sociopolitid conte.Yt: democrntic~ c~mtrtrlism
The Chinese revolution of 1949 brought unity and stability to a country torn by over a decade of war with Japan and 4 years of civil war between Nationalist and Communist forces. It also marked the culmination of a century of foreign aggression and internal conflict. The success of the peasant revolution promised radical improvement in the health and material condition of a population. devastated by war. famine and economic disaster.
The subsequent three decades have shown continuous, if occasionally erratic, economic and social development. Per capita income has risen from considerably below $100 in the first half of the century [22] Table 1 ). Furthermore, a complex referral system which reaches into the smallest villages has greatly enhanced the accessibility of health services. In contrast to Yugoslavia, however, China has not made the transition to an industrialized, urbanized society (80% of the population live in the rural areas) [25] . Whether such a transition is feasible or desirable for an underdeveloped country with a population which will reach 1300 million by the year 2000 are dilemmas which still challenge the Communist leadership 1263.
In this regard, the post-revolutionary period has been a time of political conflict over the appropriate path toward modernization.
The tension between egalitarianism and material economic development has produced a rather 'zig-zag' pattern of national development policies. After 1949. the Chinese first adopted the Soviet model of highly centralized planrung and administration.
Priority was given to industrial development, much to the detriment of the agricultural sector. institutions) more compatible with a socialist economic base. The severity of policies pursued to accomplish this resulted in such a decline in production and morale that those in power were overthrown after Mao's death in 1976. China's current leaders have since returned to more pragmatic, flexible economic policies.
The basic socialist organizations in which all social, political and economic activities are conducted were gradually established during the first decade of Communist rule. In the countryside, however. the size of these collective work groups, as well as the basic level of accounting, have varied depending upon the particular policy in vogue at the national level. Soon after the 1949 Revolution. peasants were grouped into mutual aid teams for production purposes. Agricuitural cooperatives were formed within five years, and by 1958. all of rural China was organized into large communes of approx. 16,000 people. Each commune is under the administration of the county government and divided into brigades of around 1000 people. Brigades. in turn, are divided into production teams (corresponding to one or more natural villages). These organizations of IO@200 persons have been the basic unit of work in the rural areas for the last 15 years. In the cities, people were assigned to state or collectivelyowned enterprises. and also to neighborhood organizations for the purposes of communication and control. In many cases, the work unit and neighborhood coincide as larger enterprises house workers in their own dormitories. Most business, service and commercial enterprises were socialized by 1958 [26] .
Despite shifts in political winds, decision-making in China has for the most part remained consistent with the phrase. 'Democratic Centralism'. That is. planning proposals originate at the top and are circulated to appropriate lower levels for comment. with final decisions made by the central leadership.
The implementation of decisions is left to local leaders who are responsible to higher levels of authority. major efforts have been made to increase the accessibility of services to various sectors of the population.
As a result of ideological and pragmatic policy de-, cisions, traditional Chinese medicine has been integrated into the Western-style medical care system at every level. Furthermore, as in Yugoslavia. the evofution of the post-revolutionary health system in China has mirrored changing development policies.
Thus, during the 1950s and, to a lesser extent, in the period following the Great Leap Forward, health service delivery was rather centralized and favored urban areas and industrial workers. In contrast, the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution sought a more equitable distribution of health resources and produced experiments in the transfer of personnel and funds to the countryside to achieve this objective 1241.
Today, lines of referral in both rural and urban areas are fairly standardized.
For the rural population. a decentralized network of health centers at the brigade level represents the first line of health care. These centers are staffed by 'barefoot doctors', and aided by auxiliary health workers in the production teams. 'Barefoot doctors' are paramedics trained for at least 6 months to conduct fundamental preventive and educational health work, treat minor conditions and refer more complicated cases to outpatient and inpatient facilities at the commune level. Recently, their role has been re-evaluated
[ZS] and new programs to upgrade their training and standardize the quality of care they dispense have been introduced [29] . The commune health facilities are staffed by physicians and other health personnel, and have departments for such specialities as medicine, surgery, obstetrics, gynecology and pediatrics [30] . When demed necessary, rural patients may be referred further to the better equipped and staffed county and district hospitals, or to designated urban referral hospitals Transfer to urban hospitals is rare, but does seem to occur more commonly for rural residents who live close to urban areas or who are seriously ill [31] . In the cities, primary care is provided in neighborhood and work unit clinics and in district or other city hospital outpatient departments. Like brigade health centers in the countryside, urban neighborhood and work unit clinics are usually staffed by paramedics who make referrals to physicians in hospitals and medical centers. Work unit clinics in large factories or other enterprises may have physicians as well as paramedics and can thus provide more comprehensive care to their employees.
In addition to these established lines of patient referral, the Chinese have also institutionalized transfers of personnel between levels. On the one hand. physicians and nurses from the urban hospitals are often 'sent down' to the countryside to teach. do research and disease-prevention work as well as care for patients [32] . On the other hand, paraprofessionals and other health workers from the rural areas periodically receive training or continuing education at county or urban centers. In times of political emphasis on egalitarianism.
this movement of personnel was viewed as a major source of education for all involved. Furthermore, these policies reflect the leadership's desire to de-professionalize medicine through the sharing of information with other health providers,
Very recently, though, there has been a position of patients continue to be reflected in differshift away from this egalitarian policy. with emphasis ential access to care. now placed on the modernization of medicine Despite vigorous attempts to equalize accessibility. through development of high technologies and urban China's rural peasant class remains at a distinct medical centers [28, 31] .
disadvantage. For one thing, the peasant must be In Yugoslavia, we have seen that direct state inreferred through more levels than urban dvvellers in volvement in the administration and financing of order to reach comparable health providers. Equally health care is limited. In contrast. the Chinese state important is the differential hospitalization insurance exercises greater control over the administration and plan which requires peasants and some workers to some of the financing of health care for its citizens.
pay a portion of the costs. while state workers and For example, under the direction of the national Mincadres are completely covered by their work units. istry of Health, each provincial Bureau of Health is Based on our observations [3l] . this appears to affect responsible for the assignment and salary of all staff the peasant's decision to be hospitalized (particularly (with the exception of the rural barefoot doctors and for chronic illnesses or illness which is inevitably fatal). the urban neighborhood paramedics who are selected as well as decisions by hospital clinicians regarding by their respective brigade or unit and paid through length of stay and medications. Furthermore. the local funds). All job assignments, job descriptions, salrural patients are more likely to be treated with traary scales and major management and China control so few resources which enhance professional power elsewhere (e.g. high prestige, high incomes), this observation suggests that the key variable which leads to such a hierarchical relationship between the clinician and patient is the control of medical information.
The Chinese patient is fairly powerless, but still can marshal1 other resources when necessary. The patients' families are encouraged to stay with their relatives and are often afforded more information and decision-making power than the patients. If a patient has a specific complaint. a second avenue of redress is through the patient's work unit. A complaint can be lodged with the unit leader who will discuss the problem with the appropriate physician or hospital leader. Not infrequently, the unit leader will take ani active interest in the physician's decisions, and in such situations may have an influence on the patient's care. By so doing, the patient avoids any direct confrontation with the physician which might otherwise be inconsistent with the appropriate sick role. However. this strategy only works to the patient's advantage if the unit leader is genuinely interested in the health care of his/her constituency. Like their Yugoslav counterparts, then. Chinese patients have developed ways to influence care including the use of relatives and work unit leaders as intermediaries. as well as the use of other 'connections' in the health system. According to our observations, though. outright gift-giving occurred in the case of traditional practitioners rather than in the hospital setting [36] . Finally. patients may seek health care outside the designated referral route, but will be reimbursed only if approved by clinic personnel in the work unit. Although these rules reduce 'doctor shopping' by making it an expensive personal maneuver, they leave the patlent and his or her unit a variety of health care alternatives. With the common ideological objective to make health care available to all, the two countries have created somewhat different health care systems. In China, a centralized administration coordinates development and integrates the various levels of health care delivery. Apart from medical matters, physicians have relatively little control over the social and economic conditions of their work (e.g. practice sites, salaries). There have been concerted efforts to de-professionalize medicine by sharing information with 'other health workers and through continued reliance on traditional practitioners. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand. decentralization and self-management have meant somewhat greater autonomy for health workers to control their working conditions (of course, within the boundaries of a socialized health sector). Physicians retain their dominant positions in health institutions, and priority has consistently been given to increasing the supply of these ur.iversitytrained health professionals rather than development of paraprofessionals like the Chinese barefoot doctors or Russian feldshers.
DISCUSSION
Both Yugoslavia and China have made considerable progress relative to their predecessors in improving the accessibility of health care to their respective populations.
Yet, neither has succeeded in overcoming inequalities inherited from the pre-revolutionary regimes or associated with priorities set in the course of socialist development.
Regardless of the sociopolitical system, tough decisions must be made in allocating scarce (medical) resources. And, in both Yugoslavia and China, these decisions have tended to favor urban industrial workers at the expense of the rural population.
Finally, despite differences in the sociopolitical context and organization of health services, there are nonetheless similarities in the patient-physician relationship. In both countries, the power of the physician ris-&vis the patient has resisted encroachment. Whether the physician has some autonomy to negotiate the social and economic terms of his/her work (as in Yugoslavia) or occupies a carefully prescribed bureaucratic position (as in China), the relationship between physician and patient is still hierarchical. We would argue that this is due to physicians' continued monopoly on medical information. Nevertheless, patients in each country have devised strategies (e.g. bribes. intermediaries. connections) to exert some measure of control in the medical encounter.
